This article explores Giorgio Agambenscelebrated "double paradigmofsovereignty", which introduces the Christian idea of oikonomia ("economy")asafoundational political concept in Western thinking. It argues that Agambensf ar-ranging discussion improves our understanding of how Foucaultsn otion of biopowera ctually develops historically from the matrix of earlyChristian theology and how it becomes its own kind of "political theology" to undergird the contemporarydynamics,structure,and rhetoricof neoliberalism. FollowingA gamben, the argument also builds on his thesis that "economic sovereignty" today is cemented through the power of modern forms of media in much the same way that the critical theorists of the interwar period identified the "culture industry" as the genuine hegemon of capitalism. Finally, it devotes extensive attention to the work of the French social philosopher and media theorist Bernard Stiegler and his notion of "cognitive capitalism."
Introduction
Theaim of this essay is to demonstrate how Giorgio Agambensthird volume of his critical trilogy on the concept of sovereignty entitled The Kingdom and the Glory:For aTheological Genealogy of Economy and Government can be read as framework for anew theory of global neoliberalism as "cognitive capitalism."
1 In just the last few years anumberofsignificant books and articles have appeared both criticizing and expandingonAgambensargumentinThe Kingdom and the Glory,while attempting to use his thesis to perform somesort of "genealogy" of the present day international ordertowhich scholars have attached the label of "neoliberalism." Them osti mportant of these works is DotanL eshems The Origin of Neoliberalism:Modelling the Economy from Jesus to Foucault,amassive and extremely detailedhistoricalinvestigation of Patristic theology and political theoryinlate Roman antiquity,which serves both to fill out and revise many of Agambensspeculations.
2 Of course, the book only deals with the "origin" of neoliberalism in the first five or six centuries of the Christianera and offers no real new insights on Foucaultsown contributions.Asecond work, whichfocuses more on the relationship between theological constructs and the development of early financial instruments,isDevin Singhs Divine Currency: The TheologicalP ower of Money in the West.
3 Singhsvolume combinesmuch of the Patristic literature treated by Leshem,b ut delves morea ssiduously into the kinds of innovative hypotheticals advanced by Philip Goodchild in his highly influential Theology of Money.
4
But these strictly theological genealogieso f" neoliberalism"d on ot give us anywhere near the full picture.Inaddition, the presumed linkage between Patristic thoughtand modern political economy is more ahighly suggestive historical analogyfor which the prestige of Agamben has set ascholarlybrushfire than it is a useful map for conceptualizing the presentd ay phenomenon. Rather than preoccupying ourselves withA gambensn otion of "economy," as the aforementioned researchersh ave done,w ew ill instead inquire in this essay into the formerstheoryof"glory" as the secret of the present regime of virtualized political economy.
We will show through ac lose readingo fs uch eminent theorists as Wendy Brown, Bernard Stiegler, and of course the Marxist traditiono verall how the distinguishing feature of the relatively untheorized bogeyman of progressive politics regularlybranded as "neoliberalism" is not simply capitalism gone wild. Nor is it somehow,asanumber of scholars have fancifully and polemically conjectured, the inexorable millennia-longo utgrowth of Western Christianity.S ocalled neoliberal "rationality" has far more to do with the development of a twenty-first centurysymboliceconomy -aglobal emporium of exchange built on significations and simulacra ratherthan surplus materiality or expropriated labor. It is this "mediatized" form of economic value that uniquely serves as the latter day architectonic for neoliberalism, which is apolity,aculture,aneconomy, and a structure of representationall rolled into one.Neoliberalism today has by its own internal syllogistics been the prime mover for the current "crisis of representa-tion", and we must do more than merely concentrate on the problem of markets and the fungibility of goods and services through historical exchange mechanisms to decipher the crisis itself.
If Imay badly paraphrase Jesus,"markets you will always have with you."The dark bodings of the present neoliberal momenta re to the injustice of markets what Genghis Khan was to the petty corruptions of local Byzantine officials.A much more profound and consequential set of issues are currently at stake.
The Trinitarian Watershed
In the The Kingdomand the Glory Agamben lays out in the opening sentencea projectthat will take Foucaultstheory of "governmentality" to anew level. "This study," he writes,"will inquire into the paths by which and the reasonswhy power in the West has assumed the form of an oikonomia."It"locates"itself within the ongoinggenealogical investigations that Foucault initiated in the 1970s,Agamben says,"but, at the sametime,italso aims to understand the internal reasons why they failed to be completed."F oucault was unable,A gamben suggests,t oa cknowledge "the shadow that the theoretical interrogation of the present casts onto the past reaches wellbeyond the chronological limits that Foucault causes, as if amore primordialgenetic rank would necessarily pertain to theology." In fact, it can be traced all the way back, according to Agamben, to the very "onto-theological" template for all Western thoughtitself,the three-in-oneGodhead.
Agamben announces in his opening statementt hat he aims to go beyond Foucaultsfixation on the clerico-confessional managementofboth the language and psychology of salvation compressed into the lattersnotion of the "pastorate," which becomes the groundwork for the theoryof"biopolitics". He argues that he wants to "show instead how the apparatus of the Tr initariano ikonomia may constitute aprivileged laboratory for the observation of the working and articulation -both internal and external-of the governmental machine. Forwithin this apparatus the elements -orthe polarities -that articulate the machine appear,as it were,intheir paradigmatic form."Agamben proposes afew sentences later that the question of oikonomia,w hich means of course "household" in Greek and from which we derive both of the terms economy and ecology,isultimately about the essence of "power"inthe Western context.The metaphysics of "economy" is, in crucial but somewhat opaque respects,paired with the seemingly "antinomical" (Agambenst erm)c onstruct of "sovereignty"i nt he absolute sense that Carl Schmitta nalyzed in the 1920s." Thed ouble structure of the governmental machine,w hich in Stateo fE xception (2003) appeared in the correlation between auctoritas and potestas,here takes the form of the articulation between Kingdom and Governmentand, ultimately, interrogates the very relation -which initially was not considered -between oikonomia and Glory,between power as government and effective management,and power as ceremonial and liturgical regality, two aspects that have been curiously neglected by both political philosophers and political scientists." 5 ForAgamben,both Schmitt and Foucault serve as the double axis today,much like Kantand Hegel in the nineteenth century,for an investigationofthe political. In addition, the analysisofthe political is impossible without considerationofits embedded theological substrata,afamous argument whichCarl Schmittadvanced almost acentury ago,but whichhas only been appliedfor all intents and purposes (as Agamben points out) heretofore to the notion of exceptionality (Ausnahmezustand)w ithout due regard for the increasingly relevant concept of proportionality. This question, which perhaps amountst oaD erridean aporia or "undecidable", harks all the way back to Plato and the beginnings of Western philosophy in itself.I ta lso trenches on the question in early Christianity of the significanceo f" law", or nomos,w ithin the largers cheme of what the Greeks named dikaiosyne,o r"justice". Is the law strictly situational( i. e. ,d oes it apply only,asPaul asked, to those who like the Jews are "under the law"), or is it truly "universal" in the wayt hat Kants" practical reason" later formulatedi t( i. e. , valid for all persons from all cultures and polities at all times in the same set of circumstances)?
Simply stated, is "justice" ultimately retributive or distributive? And who can, or should,a dminister it?I fj usticei sf ounded merely on sovereign, or divine, decree,then the appropriate "political" configuration is doubtlessly autocracy. If justice is allabout ratio,orproportional allotment (Simonides "rendering to each person his due") 6 ,then it must subject to what contemporary theoreticians would term "administrative" or "managerial"reason -inother words,the logic of bureaucracy and the subtle play within the biopolitical venue of "power" alongside "knowledge", as Foucault understood it. 7 Thelatter would also be the prevailing semiotic coding mechanism for presentd ay democracies. How does one,t herefore,assess real,asopposed to imagined, powerinaccordance with the paradigm of "governmentality" that Foucault initially sketched out?And whatwould be the theological episteme,asFoucault mightcall it, within which this process unfolds?
Agamben notably argues that the paradigms of both sovereignty and oikonomia derive straightawayfrom "Christian theology"-on the one hand, a"political theology,which founds the transcendence of sovereign poweronthe single God,"a nd on the otherh and, an "economict heology,r eplacing this transcendencewith the idea of an oikonomia, conceived as an immanent orderingdomestic and not political in astrictsense -ofboth divineand human life." 8 The theological provenance of both transcendentsovereignty and an "immanent or-5A gamben, The Kingdom and the Glory,loc. 113-119. 6P lato, Republic,331(e). 7S ee Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge:S elected Interviews And Other Writings (New York:Vintage,1980) . 8A gamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, dering"isthe Tr initarian formulation at Nicea. Tr initarianism historically can be seen as ac ompromise to reconcile the Caesaro-papali nstincts of Christianitys new imperial benefactor Constantine,who sought to unify the empire under one common faith, with the "pastoral" apparatusthat the underground and previously persecuted church had already achieved with its remarkable,o rganizational prowess over nearly three centuries. TheT rinitarianf ormula was also as ophisticated outworking in both ap olitical and philosophical context of the inherent "incarnational" synthesis of pagan and Jewish thoughtbrilliantly articulated from 50 to approximately 65 A.D.b yt he apostle Paul. Apart from such as ynthesis, Christianitywould not only have failed to developover time,especially after the debacle of the Jewish Warin70A.D.Itwould also have provedinadequate as a true "state religion" designed to holdt he fractious and centrifugal forces of a decaying Romane mpire together, ap rojectw hich as uccessive caesars prior to Constantine had unsuccessfully attempted under the guiseofaninnovative form of unitary "solar monothesism".
9 Theprestige of the militarized Roman state had alreadyb een in decline since the disasterso nt he frontiers ac entury earlier.
Hence,Constantine needed anew,religio-symbolic order that embraced the pieties of the alreadys prawling and largely literatec lerical classes,w hich were heavilypopulatedbyChristians. TheChristianity of antiquity from the outset was what Foucault terms "governmental", and it came to be secularized, especially in the France of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as well as Prussia during the nineteenth century,which inventedthrough the ministrationsofthe Lutheran Landeskirche what has come to be known as "state socialism". Genealogically,the Prussian prototype of as ecularized clerical state governance centered on the university and its "faculties" along with the military and ac artelized financial system dating all the wayback to the Middle Ages was the seedbed for the growth of what currently we recognizeda sl arger "neoliberal" order, not to mention Bernard Stieglers" cognitive capitalism" or PeterD ruckers" knowledge society."
From Oikonomia to Biopolitics
So far as Agamben is concerned, the "biopolitical" administrationofthe world is authorized by the idea that the divine is,i ne ffect, at riple functionary,a sf irst enunciated per scholarly consensus by the church father Irenaeus of Lyon in the latter half of the second century with his claim that the Godhead is one in reality, but manifests through three different functions, or operations.
10 Whereas Irenaeus 9S ee James B. Rives, Religion in the Roman Empire (Hoboken NJ:Wiley-Blackwell, 2006) as well as Andrew Cain, The Powero fR eligion in Late Antiquity (NewY ork: Routledge,2009). 10 Jackson J. Lashier, however, in his close reading of Irenaeus works suggest that understands the "economic" administration of the Tr iune God to entail the work of the Son as well as the Father and the Spirit, Agamben is concernedmainly with the first and third persons of the Tr inity.B ut what makes oikonomia unique, according to Agamben, is that it mirrors not the sphere of sovereignty that informs the politeia (that is,"the political") but the household. Broadly conceived, oikonomia in the Aristotelian setting has only to do with the conduct of personal or family affairs -dealings between master and slave, father and children,husband and wife -which are completely set apartfrom, and impenetrable by,the polis. Whereasinthe modern "republican", or bourgeois,setting the household would be regardeda sak ind of monadic prototype for civil society -a nd in Hegels "philosophy of right" for the rationality of the state tout court -i tw ould paradoxically in the Athenian environment be envisioned as the very penumbra of the political. How would, therefore,the "economic"model of humanrelationshipsbe gradually given separate,but importance with "despotic" sovereignty?The result would be aC hristian "politicalt heology" that would ultimatelyl eave its unmistakable "signature", as Agambenputs it, on the modernsecular order, while perhaps becomingwhat Schmitt in his later work would describe as the "nomosof the earth"?
It is ac ommonplacea mong historians that the Christian ekklesia evolved duringa nd throughout the pre-Constantiane ra as ak ind of shadow state,p urposed for the general "care of souls", filling an enormous social as well as spiritual vacuum which the militarized and overly politicized imperium was completely derelict in executing.T he role of the Christian pastorate,t herefore,b ecamei ts own kind of Aristotelian "household" writ largea nd inscribed, despite the recurrent antagonism of the imperial authorities,w ithin the "cosmopolitan" expanse of an increasingly unwieldy -a nd ungovernable -e mpire.A fter the "conversion" of Constantine,the dialectics throughout the Mediterranean world of polis versus oikonimia resulted in an unparalleled moment of Aufhebung, whichstill persistsinto the present.
At the same time, if "politics" and "economics" are now separate,y et theoretically inseparable,inthe guise of what we have come to call "politicaleconomy", and if these two modalities of "administration" have been fused ever since the age of Constantine by ad ominant political theology of both God and government as necessarily sovereign, yet simultaneously "caring" and concerned for the generalwelfare,what does that portend for the present and evolving "globalist" configuration of politiesand peoples,one in which once independent ethnicities,the pith of national sovereignty ever since the seventeenth century, have been replaced with the new transnational empire of fluid markets andnomadic capital? This new empire is no longer defined by disciplinary structures of hegemonya nd authority as much as by the swarming and "sliding" signifiers (in Lacanssense)that constitute digital communications and the infinitely rarified specimens of financial transactivity?S uch indicators,f ollowing the academic conventionsofthe last decade or so,delineate much of what has cometobeknown as "neoliberalism." And the new planetary regime that carries its name has come to be invested with acertain disrepute,even among those who are visibly as well as invisibly its agents of influence and benefactors.
At av ery superficial level, this new globald emesne of etherealized capital, which as we have seen derives its powerfrom the pseudo-ethical imperative of a "socially conscious" consumerism that will "save the planet", resembles the ancient ideal of Romanitas. Such an ideal can be summed up simply as collection of higher "humanist" values on which citizens of the empire relied in order to justify morally and culturally their brutal subjugation of the far-flung multitudes.Itwas similar to the British colonizersf iction of their "civilizing mission" throughout the nineteenth century.B ut this kind of "humanism,"w hich the Romansi nvariably contrasted with the pervasive "barbarism" which they were convinced had to be conquered and pushed back from its borders,was ultimately inadequate to keep the empire together. It inexorably fell prey to ak ind of regionalw arlordism stoked by the increasing reliance of the regime on non-citizens,orwhat today we would describe as "stateless" mercenaries,tomaintain peace and order amidst aw idely dysfunctionalp olitical, as wella ss teadily collapsing economic, system.
What the Christian oikonomia provided was ad ifferent form of governance akin to what today we would call "soft power" through the mediation of acompelling new symbolic ensemble of instrumentalities.I nA gambensv iew the power wielded by the "pastorate" in this new clerical economyderives from what he calls ap olitics of "glory." Such ap olitics is immanentlyi nscribed withint he social order to the extent that it encompassest he entirety of those who are not mere subjects, but also thosewho are claimed by,ortheorizedascoming under the authority,o ft he lordly realm.T he Medieval legal figment of a" Holy Roman empire" could not have been elaborated over the centuries without this curious sortofpastoral postulate. In Roman timesthis privilege of invoking such aprinciple was accorded only to the narrow circle of those holding "citizenship". But the early church rendered it "transcendental" in the sense that it promoted anovel style of "subjectivity" through baptism into,and participation within, the body of Christ. In other words,b ecause of the pastoral postulate Christians were constituteda sm ore than simply political subjects.T hey were incorporated soteriologically,ratherthan strictly civically, into a"kingdom not of this world."
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The InstrumentalityofGlory and the Origins of aSymbolic Economy
Augustine,w riting during the decades of imperial prostration in the early fifth century, first laid out the general theory of such dual subjecthood in his City of God. But while he,l ike Paul, lookedf or the reconciliation of these "two kingdoms" only at the moment of an eschatological finale,h is ecclesiastical imagination laid the groundwork for the revival of the Constantinian synthesis during the high Middle Ages and eventually for the rise of a novum ordoseclorumn in the late modern period. Theq uestion of "glory"a s" the uncertain zone in which acclamations,ceremonies,liturgies,and insignia operate", for Agamben, came to be transposed from the sacerdotal to the symbology of secular politics overall.
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Agamben writes:" glory is the place where theology attempts to think the difficult conciliation between immanent trinitya nd economict rinity,t heologia and oikonomia,being and praxis,God in himself and God for us.For this reason, the doxology, despite its apparent ceremonial fixity,isthe mostdialecticalpart of theology,i nwhich what can only be thoughtofasseparate must attain unity."
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Theinstrumentality of "glory," which was used routinely by both kings and clergy up untilearly twentieth century and became the flash pointfor the kind of sectarian conflict that eventually morphedi nto anti-clerical political revolutions, served as the precursor, according to Agamben, for the aestheticization of mass politics that found its mostdemonic expression in the varioustotalitarianisms of the twentieth century."We find here,aswefind at the hidden root of all aestheticisms," Agamben notes,"the need to coverand dignify what is in itself pure force and domination". 13 But this "aesthetic" subterfuge can alsob eu nderstood in terms of the virtualizationofpolitics through both earlierand later forms of media and the manipulation of what once were material interests through the idealizing mechanismsofa"symbolic economies," about which Ihave written in my book Force of God.
14 Thei dea of ap urelys ymbolic economyw as advanced during the 1970s by a lesser known French post-structuralist theorist namedJean-Joseph Goux, roughly about the same time as Foucault began his decade of lectures at the College de France.ItisGouxsoverarching approach, adaptedfrom Marxsanalysis of the fetishism of commodities in BookIof Capital as the generativeprinciple in the formation of surplus value,that helps us frame abroader theory of neoliberalism as global governancebypurely semiotic operators. These operators,or"signifiers", are not so much acover for"pure force and domination" as they are they are the force of domination itself. Goux relies on Marxso bservations about how commodificationserves as an anticipation of the ultimate epiphany of alienated labor under the aspect of money.Political economy, not only for Marx but for anumber of his predecessors,comes down to the issue of how value is created. In Marxs final analysis,s uch value constitutes different transmutations,o r" crystallizations", of labor as commodities,culminating in their "dazzling moneyform."
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Commodification progresses throught he increasingly obscure alchemyo ft he markete xchange mechanism. In order for commodities to be exchanged, their "values" must be compared by somek ind of rational set of criteria. But the commodities themselves cannot serve as abasis of comparison. Their valuesare merely "relative" to each other.
Thus there mustemerge ageneralprinciple for comparing the relative values of commodities,a"value of values",sotospeak, or what political economy designates as a" general equivalent". Theb randishing of the general equivalentr equires that we excise the value of the labor that went into making it, yieldinga more recondite form of value containing nothingm ore than "abstract labor." Marx writes that "the body of the commodity that serves as the equivalent, figures as the materialisation of human labour in the abstract, and is at the sametime the product of some specifically useful concrete labour."
16 Them oney form of the commodity becomes the very prima materia for the accumulation of "surplus" labor value (Mehrwert)from which all historicalvariants of "capitalism" spring. Theg eneral equivalent, or the "money form,"t herebyb ecomes the sorcerers apprentice that sets in motion an endlessp rocession of formal correlations ("simulacra,"a sJ ean Baudrillardc alls them), converting material inputs into immaterial regalia. This "virtualization" of concrete valuet hrough commodity production, especially in the money form, is also the occasion for class conflict and exploitation, so far as Marx is concerned.
Marx, of course,inhis fidelity to Hegeliandialectics believed that this process over time would bringabout theripening of multiple,inherent "contradictions" in the system, leading to its eventualb reakdown and the onset of revolution.B ut what Marx did not foresee was the wayinwhich the virtualization process itself, including what Maurizzio Lazzarato terms "immaterial labor", could be further virtualized and consequently commodified, bringing into being the brave new world of today where "knowledge" is not asimple condition for the manufacture of usable "things," but athing to be produced and valued for itself,which is what we really have in mind when we prattle on about "knowledge workers" and the "knowledge society."
Goux explains how this kind of transformation takes place:" instead of the relation, in which symbolicity is constituted;insteadofexchange,throughwhich subjects,inpartially reversible fabric,can metabolize the signifiers that constitute them -t he symbolic freezes into ar igid mediationt hat dominates them. Furthermore,ifthe symbolic relations introducesathird entity,amediating element, by which the ceaseless floods of the imaginary are absorbed …asymbolic counteraction, operating like aforced currency,blocks the balancing process and dispossess subjects of their own activity,t hrough the symbolic functionso ft he state,money,the concept."
18 Thus the contemporary "crisis of representation" can be understood as fundamentaltothe very translation of politeia into oikonomia, or at least the beginningofarecognition that they are interchangeable somehow at an ontological level. Thei ntroductiono ft he primordial intuition of value as "exchange value", which definesthe "economic"paradigm as awhole,demands this shift in our perception.
The Neoliberal Moment
Nevertheless,itisnot only money that presents itself as the new face of tyranny in serving to "dispossess" subjects of what is properly their own through the apparatus of symbolization, virtualization, and de-materialization.Ifthe virtualization of finance had alot to do,asmost analysts agree,with the Great Recession that started in the fall of 2008, the digitizationand proliferation of personalizedmedia has been adrivingforce in the degeneration of politics into low-grade civil war. Standard critiques of neoliberalism,especially sincethe instant media sensation that came to be known as the Occupy movement in September 2011, have focused on the heightened maldistribution of wealth and tracedthe currentmalaisetoa revivalofapredatory capitalism not seen since the 1890s.But amore recentwave munications technologiesincreasingly require subjectivities that are rich in knowledge.It is not simply that intellectual labor has become subjected to the norms of capitalist production. What has happened is that anew mass intellectuality has come into being, created out of acombination of the demands of capitalist production and the forms of self-valorization that the struggle against work has produced. Theo ld dichotomy between mental and manuallabor, or between material labor and immaterial labor, risks failing to grasp the new nature of productive activity,which takes this separation on board and transforms it. Thesplit between conception and execution, between labor and creativity,b etween author and audience,i ss imultaneously transcended within the labor process and reimposed as political commandw ithin the process of valorization. of literature has focused on the hegemonyofthe symbolic economy itself.Many of these writers have drawn attention to the co-dependency of such an economy with what we mightterm consumptive consumerism. Wendy Brown, perhaps foremost among such theorists,characterizes the way in which these symbolic economies expropriate not only apersonslabor, but their very valueand self-worth.T hey force us to become "entrepreneurs of the self", an expression coined by Foucault which Brown leverages extensively in her argument that neoliberalism transforms everything into capital, especially the kind of "personal capital" that thoroughly reconstitutes individual self-worth as professional identity in keepingwith socially enforced criteria of symbolic comparison. Brown writes: "The figure of the human as an ensemble of entrepreneuriala nd investment capital is evident on every college and job application, every package of study strategies, every exercise, every new diet and exerciseprogram. Thebest university scholars are characterized as entrepreneuriala nd investments avvy,n ot simply by obtaining grants or fellowships,but by generating new projects and publications from old research, calculating publication and presentation venues,a nd circulating themselves and their worka ccording to what will advance their value."
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At the sametime,what these strategieso fboth cultural and economic analysis, which prove to be intimately intertwinedw hen it comes to the critique of neoliberalism, tend to miss is the determinativer ole of media.A st he pioneers of criticalt heory within the so-called Frankfurt School during the first half of the twentieth century realized,t he "holy alliance"o fc ulture and capital, which achieves its Gramscian-style synthesis in the evolvingfigurations of social control throughn ot only mass media platforms but also individualized digital communication, is the real dark matter that needs to be illuminated by the light of reason. Thepolitics of mediatizationneed to be reviewed in light of the mediatizationof politics,a nd that is where Agambensc laim that modern communications provides an aura of "glory" for democratic politics,w here pompa nd pageantry no longer suffice,t urns out to be suggestive,e ven while it remains rather obscure. According to Agamben, Schmittsrule that politics rests on amonarchial declaration of sovereignty -oratleast aconstant condition of inimicality (the"friend/ enemy distinction") analogous to the state of exception-o nly works within an autocratic setting.
Rousseausn otiont hat sovereignty in af ormal sense can also be engraved within the demosi sn ot necessarily compatible with Schmittsd eduction of political power.Likewise,Rousseauscontention that democratic sovereignty has a historical warrant,insofarasitinvokes contra Hobbes acertain commensurability of the political with life the state of nature ("manisborn free,but everywhere he is in chains"), presses us toward accepting the "economic"m odel of governance. Such am ove is consistent with the kind of providentialc alculus concerning the rise and fall of human societies implied in Adam Smithsm etaphor of the "invisible hand", and it constitutes an epochal shift in the rudimentary representation of "political economy" as awhole.
Agamben perhaps takes Rousseau further than he would have otherwise been willing to go.One of the essential tensions in the eighteenth century theory of the social contract turns out to be tug-of-war betweenthe ideal of collective cohesion founded in the "general will" and the need for some kind of transcendental legitimation of democratic sovereignty.W ith the latter goal in mind,R ousseau came up with the heuristics of a"civil religion."Rousseausformulation of such a civil religion can be found toward the close of The Social Contract: "therei s therefore apurelycivil profession of faith of whichthe Sovereign should fix the articles,not exactly as religious dogmas, but as social sentiments without which a man cannot be agood citizenorafaithful subject." 20 These "social sentiments" can only be buttressed by the weight of the symbolic. Thepotencyofthe symbolic, or what Agamben terms "glory", has its avatars in the era of democratic egalitarianism with what Guy Debordfamously named the "society of the spectacle." Agamben writes that:
"If we link Debordsanalysis with Schmittsthesis according to whichpublic opinion is the modern form of acclamation, the entire problem of the contemporary spectacle of media domination over all areas of social lifeassumes anew over all areas of social life assumesanew guise.W hat is in question is nothing less than an ew and unheard of concentration, multiplication, and dissemination of the function of glory as the centerof the political system. What was confined to the spheres of liturgy and ceremonials has become concentrated in the media and, at the same time,through them it spreads and penetrates at each moment into every area of society,b oth public and private.C ontemporary democracyisademocracy that is entirely foundedupon glory,that is,onthe efficacyo fa cclamation, multiplied and disseminated by the mediab eyond all imagination. (That the Greek term for glory -doxa -isthe same term that today designates public opinion is,f rom this standpoint, somethingm ore than ac oincidence.)A sh ad always been the case in profanea nd ecclesiastical liturgies, this supposedly" originary democratic phenomenon"isonce again caught, orientated, and manipulatedinthe forms and according to the strategies of spectacular power." 
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Neoliberal Hegemony and the "Undoing" of the Demos Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2 formation of sovereignty within the modern demos. However, it becomes immediately apparent, once we read just alittle further in this concluding reflection of Agambens The Kingdom and the Glory,which admittedly is not as developed or well-formed as it should be,that he is alluding to Jürgen Habermas theoryof "communicative action."H abermas recipe for democracy as founded on the inherent rationality of communicative,ordeliberative,power is well-known. As HabermasdeclaresinBetween Facts and Norms (1996) ,"all political powerderives from the communicativepower of citizens." 22 Habermas grounds this assertion in what he dubs an "illocutionary" construct of rationality -something akin to,more "Platonist" in its origins,towhat Derrida came to call the "New Enlightenment" -"when languageisconceived as universal medium forembodying reason."
23 Themaintenance of linguistic coherence as a "postmodern" version of the classic political logos,resident within the systemsor communicative transaction and symbolic exchange comprisingt he new cosmopolitan agora,fosters in our present day "lifeworld" (to invoke Habermas own expression) the conditions for both democratic participation and the commitment of citizenstosome form of the "common" or "public" good. ForAgamben,this preservation of Habermas "knowledge-constitutivei nterests" through the cultivation of apluralized, yet intelligible fabric of shared discourse is not,however, to be established pragmaticallyt hrough the intervention of the academic disciplines,e specially philosophy.S uch ah igher, governmental role for "critical theory" was always the aspiration of the Frankfurt School, and can perhaps be tracedall the way back to Platosown call for rule by "philosopher kings." It can, at least, be linkedtosome of the inclinations of Frederick the Great duringthe eighteenth century in his dream of aE urope commandeered by "enlightened despots". Frederick sought to replace the hegemony of the clergy with that of professors,anepisode in the evolution of the social imaginary that inspiredtoa certain degree the founding of the Prussian state system of universal education, which would indirectly nurture a"virtuous" citizenry.
The"glory" of the democratic and "holistic" state in the view of Agambenis "founded on the immediate presence of the acclaimingpeople,and the neutralized state that resolves itself in the communicative forms withouts ubject, are opposed only in appearance.They are nothing but two sidesofthe sameglorious apparatus in its two forms:the immediate and subjective glory of the acclaiming people and the mediatic and objective glory of social communication."
24 According to Agamben, "glory"inthis regard demonstrates "its dual aspect,divine and human, ontological and economic,o ft he Father and the Son."F ollowing Habermas distinction, it can be construed as mediating both "the people-substance and the people-communication." 25
Bernard StieglersNew Critique of Political Economy
But what if Agamben were dead wrong,and what if his notion of mediatic "glory" has metasized, as we are seeing increasingly nowadays,turned out instead to be the tawdry? What if this "tawdriness" were in fact the inevitable "cash-out" of the symbolic economyi tself,o fa na ppalling, but spectacular climax to the ongoing virtualization of both laborand capital in alatter day,gargantuan immolationof both meaning and significationwherebythe "crisis of representation" becomes a global catastrophe of the political itself ?What if the linguistics of "communicative reason" had now morphed as in somekind of insidiousmutation of its own semiotic genomes into ah yperpartisan "hate machine?" How could that even happen?Inorder to answer that question, we must begin to pay heed to Bernard Stieglersurgent call for a"new critique of political economy" that understands the linguistic process in keeping with both Platosa nd Derridasr eading pharmakon,asboth "poison and remedy." Stieglersbrilliant analysis of the problem, published in 2010 at atime when the current sordid state of politics was lamentably but as mall,l owering cloudo nt he horizon, calls into question the very sentimental assumptionsa bout the connections between democracy,d iscourse, rationality,a nd mediatice xpression,w hich Agamben togetherw ith Habermas have dangledi nf ront of us." We thus have purec ognitivel abor power utterly devoid of knowledge with cognitive technologies,Stiegler writes" 26 ."Thecognitive elites" are "deprivedoftheir own logic and by their logic-alogic reduced to a calculation without remainder as well as to amarket of fools."
27
In order to achieve abetter graspofwhat Stiegler intends with such acomment, we need to flesh out his larger perspective. For ACritique of Political Economy pulls together many of the threads of his extensive, earlier writings to revive acall for ac ritique of capitalism in the twenty-first century that takesu pf rom what Marx left undone in the nineteenth century.Stieglerset forth these remarks in the immediate wake of the worldwide economic crisis that began in the fall of 2008, but becamemanifest in 2009. In the first chapter entitled "Heads Buried in the Sand:AWarning,"Stiegler makes the case that both the Keynesian "stimulus"to what was supposed to have engineered recovery from the Great Recession and the digital automation of industry that is proceeding apace "is the translation of a 
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28 At the same time,S tiegler is not merely advancing some cheap,h ackneyed version of rhetoric against capitalism per se.I ti st he distinctive new kind of capitalism-i. e. ,"cognitive capitalism" -that is bringing the crisis to ahead. Cognitive capitalism constitutes an economic as well as asocial apocalypse of the virtualization process,t he beginnings of whicha ntedate electronic mediabytwo and ahalf millennia. Theoverarching philosophical dilemma we have dubbed the "crisis of representation" is centered on the technical issue of hypomnesis,orthe exteriorization of memory,Plato identified in the Phaedrus as the danger posed by writing. Platospreoccupation was the loss of direct access to the real, ap osition Derrida in Of Grammatology characterizeda s" ontotheological".
Writing, Plato insists in the lattersection of the Phaedrus,isanti-philosophical because it offers us "learningr ather than wisdom"( sofía& dè toĩ& maqhtaĩ& dó xan) 29 ,and philosophy is of course the pursuit of the latter. Such "learning" is mere "semblance" (doxa), and even though it provides expandingopportunities for the elaboration of new discursive connections,i tf osters an amnesia of the thing itself,a sH eideggerw as fond of pointingo ut, through the production of incessant re-presentations (or if we wish instead to use Baudrillardsterminology, we can say the "precession of simulacra". Such re-presentations are,ifwewant to use acurrent clichØ,aform of "fake presence."And it is "presence", or ousia,in the Platonic tradition that constitutes the authentic object sought through philosophical inquiry.Stiegler, astudent of Derrida who in turn criticized the Socratic discomfort with writing as a"potion" (pharmakon)that simultaneously "poisons" the well of wisdom while "remedying" the affliction of forgetfulness ironically seemst os ide with Plato.B ut his Platonic sympathies have little to do witha preference for ontology.The crisis of representation derivesfrom the manner in which "learning" (mathesis), or the spatio-temporal codingand archiving of what was once knowledge by acquaintance,comes to reify the hypomnetic process as the human essence itself.
Thus the invention of "writing,"w hich by Stieglersr eckoning is but ac onvenient tropefor hypomnesis as awhole encompassing everything from symbolic logic to electronic bits and bytes,sets in motion an historical juggernaut careening toward a"transhuman" future. Hypomnesis is what we really mean by "capital" as ar endering of Marxs" alienated labor", and it threatens to eclipse us all as "artificially" intelligent machinest hat not only eliminate jobs,b ut even human intimacy (think the latest, uncannily human "sexbots" that are creepinginto the market). Thedifference between "wisdom" (sophia)and "learning", or "science" (mathesis), is whatS tiegler calls savoir faire versus savoir vivre. Science and technology furnish only "know-how" (savoir-faire), engendered from experiences brought about through manipulation of the human environmentusingsymbolic tokens and apparatuses.
Relying on terminology harking back to Edmund Husserl,S tiegler refers to this mode of sign-production as "tertiary retention."T ertiary retention is thekey to hypoamnesis,b ecause it gives impetus to aw ider process Stieglerd ubs "grammatization,"aconvolutedb ut inexorable and irrepressible historical movement for which the development of writing is only the first instantiation. In other words,g rammatization, which encompasses everything from manuscripts and theirdissemination to the even more sophisticated use of numbers and formal protocols for ciphering equivalencies to abstract reasoning on the part of both homo sapiens and computingmachinery,consists in the commodification of truth itself.The commodification of labor,asMarx understood it, is merely one moment in the unfolding of amuch greater and consequential trendline."Alienated labor" is simply ah arbinger of the eventual extinction of what it means to be human, which relieso nsavoir vivre, "knowingh ow to live." Ag enuine "critique of political economy," for Stiegler, cannot be separatedf rom the critique of human knowledge overall.
Stieglerinsists that this extreme stage of alienation conceals agenuine crisis of capitalism. We might add that it appearsa sw ell to be the watermark of neoliberalism itself." Thec apitalist economy strictlys peaking no longer works," Stieglercontends,"becauseitwants the psychic individualism to be self-detected, to become the entrepreneur of the self,w ithout collective individuation, but rather through ac ollective disindividuation orchestrated by marketing,"w hich Stieglerwrites includes both the so-called "conservative revolution" of 1980s and the present post-millennialphase of global, corporate neoliberalism.
30 Thenotion that contemporary culture is aform of self-entrepreneurship whereby our alienated self-knowledge now becomes ak ind of high-octane fuel that powers the capacious neoliberal modus operandi,ofcourse,can be attributedtoBrown in her Undoing the Demos. Brown is the first to recognize that neoliberalism is not merelyatendentious set of economic principles,but "a form of normative reason remaking the state,s ociety,a nd subject, generating social policy,p ositing truth and atheory of law." It is,ineffect, "a revolutionaryand comprehensive political rationality,o ne that draw on classical liberal languagea nd concerns while inverting many of liberalismsp urpose and channels of accountability." 31 Brown stresses that neoliberalism subtlys tands on its head the classical liberal values emphasizing personal freedom by summoning such grandiloquence to perform the task of constrainingthe socialagent to the unfreedom of self-entrepreneurship in the name of the vast, collectiveg ood -w hat she terms "responsibilism."R esponsibilismnever prescribes an objective, person, or idea to which is nevertheless always"responsible." Onecan never do enough, becausethere is always infinitely more to do.R esponsibilityi su nbounded;i ti sf orever committed to an imperceptible "elsewhere."
CognitiveCapitalism and the Crisis of Neoliberal Hegemony
Theidolatry of cognitive capitalism, whichseduces both of our instincts for selfvalidation and helping others,isfounded on an ethic of "knowledge,thought, and training" that are "valued and desired fortheir contribution of capital enhancement."
32 It should be noted that contrary to latter day sentimentality of todays "Bohemian bourgeoisie" that is fond of parroting Marxist slogansf rom the cubicle of atech firm offering exorbitant salaries and benefits,orfrom the comfort of an oak-paneled university office where "revolutionary" ideology is not matched by the commitment to taking authentic political risks,the real neoliberal power complex is no longer vested in the likes of neither Ebenezer Scrooge,t he Koch Brothers,nor even the legendary "military industrial complex". Instead it accrues to the captainso ft he new "knowledge industries", allied with intelligence agencies and vast, government bureaucracies,who leveragethe infrastructureof electronic communications networksmore and more to manage and regulate the contents of information flow and their formatting into usable snippets of insight. Thenew planetary space of cognitive capitalism (it is actually,heinsinuates rather cryptically at ype of "mafia capitalism"), according to Stiegler,b ecomes av ast desert of "pure calculable exchange" wearingt he deceptive mask of "socially conscious" enterprise.I tb ecomes at ype of transnational, postmodern, postChristian secular "supergo", as Emmett Rensin has called it 33 ,that exploits in its own uniquestyle the consumerist "will to nothingness,"asNietzsche would have described it.
Stiegler is not, however, an unrepentant pessimist. LikeMarx, he offers his own eschatological vision, which we will explore in some of the passagesthat follow. But what is missing in Stiegler -and to alarge degree in the growing chorus of critics as well as diagnosticians of the deeper "logic" of neoliberalism -isthe way in whichthis novel type of "political rationality" is driven by and large by mediatization itself.Inother words,how does Agambensmediatic "glory"alchemize into the basestillustration of the "tawdry"? In ordertoanswer that question, we must examine anothercore concept of Stieglers, what he in avery plain-spoken manner identifies as "stupidity"(bÞtise) 34 . 32 Brown, Undoing the Demos,177. 33 Emmett Rensin, The Blathering Superego at the End of History. 34 TheFrench word bÞtise,which Stiegler strategicallyemploys,can also be translated as "brutishness", "senselessness", or even "foolishness",d epending on the context. Stieglerwants to drive home that is acondition of the late modern era that does not call in an obvioussense for moralopprobrium, but is akind of fatuousness that can precipitate Stiegler views his calling as arenewal of the taskdefined by Horkheimer and AdornoinThe Dialectic of Enlightenment and detailed at the height of the Second World War, that of courageously investigating how the Age of Reasonhad metastasized into the pseudo-politicso ft otalitarianism, where" public life has reached astate in whichthought is being turned inescapably into acommodity and language into celebration of the commodity." 35 Thecommodification of thought and language,for Stiegler, is far more complicated than what the Frankfurt School interpreteda st he descent of reason into unreason, the "reversion" of logos to mythos,a sm anipulated cunningly through fascist propaganda. It is the baleful outcome of the triumph in all spheres of hypomnesic technology and its very "interiorization" in both conscious and unconscious life."What is occurring, on a scale and in conditions that were hitherto inconceivable," Stiegler writes,"is the effectofwhat Gramsci described as acultural hegemonythat de-forms reasonreasonunderstoodinEnlightenment terms as that historical and socialconquest that now seems to decomposesorapidly into rationalization." 36 In his Prison Writings from 1929-35 Gramsci himself had foreseen this evolution with his observation that Hegels" ethicals tate"a st he embodiment of moral and culturalreason (favored by liberal democrats) had fallen victim to the same kind of "fetishism"that Marx ascribed to the logic of commodification. This fetishism marksusurpation of what Gramsci calledthe "philosophy of praxis" by the cultural and linguistic apparatus exercised through popularc ommunication techniques appropriated by the rising class.Writing at that juncture in the history of Europe when fascism had supplanted classc onsciousness with what the Frankfurt School had recognized as ah ostile takeovero ft he collective unconscious under the sway of the "culture industry", Gramsci discerned that hegemonic relations in twentiethcentury societywere neither political nor economic so much as they were semiotic. In that respect Gramsci was the one,l ong before Stiegler, to cognize how any "revolutionary" seizure of the means of production could not be separated from the means of culture production. Moreover, such a seizure,i fi tw ere possiblea ta ll, would have to depend on an ew kind of communicative internationale,w ho through auniversal dictatorshipo fthe cognitive proletariat would would upend the system of semiotic control in accordancewith which Foucaultean biopower resolves itself into the most insidious subterfuges of logopower. "Every relationship of hegemony", Gramsci contends," is necessarily an educational relationship and occurs not only within anation, between the variousforces that comprise it […] in the entire international and world field."
37
It is significantt hat Gramsci alluded in his notebooks to the emerging hegemonic role of journalism, which he characterized as ac ontingent of "pocketgeniuses", which pretendstobe"holding the whole of history in the palm of its hand."
38 But Gramsci was naturally unable to anticipate the digitization of both news and entertainment media where the "manufacture of consent" was boosted exponentially by an explosion, if not the amalgamation, of digital communication and commerce,especially whatwenow know as "socialmedia". In socialmedia Stieglers"tertiary retention" desiccates not only livedexperience, but the spiritual fabric of human relationships,a ne lectronic bellumo mnium contra omnes that has become the strange and eminently hostile "twittering" virtual universe we know as politics in this day and age.The demos that has been "undone"bythis global apotheosis of grammatization and mediatization (by aproliferation of not only "fake news" but "fakeagencies" of the electronic sort that cull, peddle,and feature what we are supposed to know through marketizing algorithms and hyperbots that exercise their own seamless,y et invisible control over the new "symbolic milieu" (Stiegler) .
Stiegler himself calls for an insurrection against this pervasive alien dominion of amachinic "deep state" that might be fomented somehow through arecovery of the intimacy of wisdom itself,the wisdom of the body,ofclassical mnemosyne, of philosophy as the philia of sophia,something akin to AlainBadiousnotionof love itself as ar evolutionary praxis,o r" truth procedure."S uch an insurrection requires the severance,a ccording to Stiegler, of "the interface between the technical system and social systems" and the "economics ystem."T he upshot would be whath ec alls lØconomie de contribution ("the economy of contribution"), which unfortunately he does not specify in any detail. Knowledge must be valued for its own sake,oratleast for social flourishing.Such asociety would be anti-consumerist. In an interview with ar epresentative of the Macif they serve.Inthe 20th century it was the consumerswho were proletarized and we lost the old knowledge. Proleterization isntf inancialp overty,b ut the loss of knowledge.C onsumers do not produce their own way of living, which is now prescribedb yt he big corporate names." 39 Although Stieglerssolution sounds vague and not alittle utopian -and certainly does not have the "critical" transformational perspective we would expect perhaps from such incisive social and political theorizing -itsteers us in adirection from whichthe broadercritique of neoliberalism oftenshies away.
Thecrisis of neoliberal hegemony comes downtoacrisis of liberal democracy stemming from the crisis of representation that can be tracked all the way back to the end of the Aufklärung. It is ah ollowing out of the political, caused by the passageo fd ialectic into ah ighly undialectical planetary economism of algebrarically codified and commodifieddesire. Thesame process is spurred on by the sophisms of marketing (in contradistinction to the production of exchange values on the market itself), where the sublimation of drivesinthe traditional Weberian analysis is transmuted into what Herbert Marcuse called "repressive desublimation",a ccording to which "the progress of technological rationality is liquidating the oppositional and transcending elements in the higher culture." 40 Thef undamental challenge of the new era is to recapture the sense of "real presence" in both our languageinour social relations,and in our politics.
